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After years of dormancy, the Congressional Review Act (“CRA”) suddenly 
plays a prominent role in agency policymaking. Under the CRA, Congress has 
overturned multiple major regulations adopted by the Obama Administration,1 
and the campaign continues. The next stage in this rollback appears to be a 
program of invalidating agency guidance documents, policy statements, and 
interpretations. That possibility has frightened many observers because it 
appears to expose an enormous additional amount of policymaking to CRA 
attack. We argue that, to the contrary, using the CRA in an attempt to overrule 
agency policy statements and interpretations will be fruitless, and the effort 
will, in the long run, reveal important limits on the CRA.  
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1 See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 115-4, 131 Stat. 9 (2017) (disapproving rule, Disclosure of Payments 
by Resource Extraction Issuers, 81 Fed. Reg. 49,359 (July 27, 2016) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pt. 240 and 249b), requiring disclosure of payments to foreign governments by 
resource extraction issuers for oil and gas development); Pub. L. No. 115-8, 131 Stat. 15 
(2017) (disapproving rule, Implementation of the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 
2007, 81 Fed. Reg. 91,702 (Dec. 19, 2016) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 421), adding 
certain requirements to report to the National Instant Criminal Background Check System). 
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I. A CRA PRIMER 
 
The CRA was part of the Contract with America, the program of 
reform—or overhaul—under which Republicans swept into power in Congress 
in 1994. The CRA requires every agency that promulgates a rule to submit a 
report on it to Congress, in which the agency includes a copy of the rule, a brief 
summary of the rule, and the intended effective date of the rule.2 A rule cannot 
“take effect” until the agency has transmitted this report.3 At the same time, the 
agency must also send to the Government Accountability Office a copy of the 
rule’s cost-benefit analysis, its analysis or certification under the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act, and other similar analyses.4  
The report gives Congress an opportunity to pass a joint resolution 
disapproving the rule. This joint resolution is a law like any other; it requires 
the President’s signature or a vote overriding a veto. A rule that is the subject 
of a disapproval resolution is essentially nullified; the resolution says the rule 
“shall have no force or effect.”5 The CRA gives two special privileges to 
disapproval resolutions. First, an agency apparently cannot resurrect a 
disapproved rule: “A rule that does not take effect (or does not continue)” 
thanks to a CRA resolution “may not be reissued in substantially the same 
form, and a new rule that is substantially the same as such a rule may not be 
issued.”6 Second, for a limited time window, a CRA resolution receives 
expedited treatment and an exemption from certain legislative procedures—
most significantly from Senate filibusters.7 
																																								 																				
2 5 U.S.C. § 801(a). 
3 If a rule is “major,” it cannot take effect until at least 60 days after the agency sends the 
report. § 801(a)(3). 
4 § 801(a)(1)(B). 
5 § 802(a). 
6 § 801(b)(2). 
7 § 802(c), (d). 
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To receive these benefits, a CRA resolution must have a specific, simple 
form. It resolves “[t]hat Congress disapproves the rule submitted by the [agency 
in question] relating to [the title or subject of the rule at issue], and such rule shall 
have no force or effect.”8 It cannot say anything else. In addition, a CRA 
resolution must be introduced during a window beginning “on the date on which 
the report” is received or the date the rule was published in the Federal Register, 
whichever is later, and ending on the 60th day afterwards.9  
The principal function of the CRA is to make it easier, in a transfer of 
power between political parties, for the incoming majority party to undo the 
regulatory policies of the outgoing party. The CRA is chiefly useful only if the 
incoming President is of the same party as majorities in both Houses of 
Congress. If either House majority is of the outgoing party, and thus an 
opponent of the incoming party, that House is fairly unlikely to approve a CRA 
resolution. If the President is of the outgoing party, the President is unlikely to 
sign the resolution. Of course, Congress could overrule a veto. But if there were 
enough votes to do that, the CRA’s procedural benefits (such as avoiding the 
filibuster) would be worth little—and probably not worth the straitjacket that 
the CRA places on the content of a disapproval resolution. Thus, a CRA 
resolution is unlikely unless the Presidency changes parties and the new 
President is of the same party as majorities in both Houses.  
The CRA resets the clock with respect to rules in the last months of a 
congressional session, which allows the incoming Congress the ability to undo 
a substantial volume of past policy. If an agency submits a rule less than 60 
Senate session days or House legislative days before the end of a session, the 
time for joint resolutions begins in the next session, on the 15th session day or 
legislative day.10 This 60-session-day period captures far more than so-called 
“midnight rules” (the common nickname for rules that an outgoing admin-
istration issues in its final days).11 At the end of the Obama Administration, the 
60th session day before the end of the session was in mid-June.12  
																																								 																				
8 § 802(a). 
9 Id. Days on which either House of Congress is adjourned for more than three days during 
a session don’t count toward the 60 days. A resolution gets expedited, filibuster-free 
treatment only during the 60-day window. 
10 § 802(e)(2). 
11 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-183, OMB SHOULD WORK WITH AGENCIES 
TO IMPROVE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT COMPLIANCE DURING AND AT THE END OF 
PRESIDENTS’ TERMS 1 (2018) defines “midnight” as the last 120 days, and it provides data 
about midnight rulemaking from the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations. 
12 CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS & RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IN10437, AGENCY 
FINAL RULES SUBMITTED ON OR AFTER JUNE 13, 2016, MAY BE SUBJECT TO DISAPPROVAL 
BY THE 115TH CONGRESS 1 (2016). 
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Before 2017, only one CRA resolution became law: disapproval of a 
Labor Department rule on ergonomics.13 Accordingly, there has been no case 
in which an agency adopted a rule that was arguably “substantially the same” 
as a previously disapproved rule. There has also been no case elaborating what 
it means for a rule to have “no force and effect”—a phrase, we will argue 
below, that is narrower than it at first appears. The real effect of CRA resolu-
tions remains to be seen. 
 
II. THE NEW INITIATIVE: CRA DISAPPROVAL OF GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS 
 
In the Trump Presidency, CRA resolutions have become almost 
routine. Fifteen of them have passed as of April 2019, disapproving rules 
ranging from an amendment to federal procurement rules to a consumer-
protection rule restricting the use of arbitration clauses.14 
Nearly all of those rules were “legislative” rules—creating rights and 
obligations, and adopted through notice and comment, published in the Federal 
Register, and accompanied with the full panoply of rulemaking such as 
Regulatory Flexibility Act compliance.15 The latest initiative has been to use 
the CRA to overturn agency guidance documents. The Government 
Accountability Office (“GAO”) concluded, in response to an inquiry from 
Senator Pat Toomey, that a particular guidance document that federal banking 
regulators issued regarding leveraged lending was a rule for purposes of the 
CRA.16 The guidance in question informed depository institutions about the 
regulators’ expectations of how institutions will manage the risk of leveraged 
lending, and identified conduct that would likely lead regulators to take 
supervisory action. The GAO acknowledged that the document was only a 
general statement of enforcement policy and did not establish any binding 
norms. Yet, the GAO noted, general statements of policy are “rules” under the 
																																								 																				
13 Pub. L. No. 107-5, 115 Stat. 7 (2001). President Obama vetoed five CRA resolutions 
during his tenure. See DAVIS & BETH, supra note 12, at 1. 
14 GAO has a list on its website. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., https://www.gao.gov/ 
legal/congressional-review-act/faq [https://perma.cc/9GYZ-VCDA] (last visited Mar. 16, 
2019).  
15 See Truckers United for Safety v. Fed. Highway Admin., 139 F.3d 934, 938-39 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) (describing hallmarks of a legislative rule); Cent. Tex. Tel. Coop., Inc. v. Fed. Comm. 
Commission, 402 F.3d 205, 214 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting that the requirement to issue an 
impact statement “under § 604 of the Regulatory Flexibility Act . . . applies only to legislative 
rules”). 
16 Letter from Susan A. Poling, General Counsel, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., to Senator 
Pat Toomey, U.S. Senate (Oct. 19, 2017) (on file with U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/687879.pdf.)   
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Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) definition, and the CRA incorporates 
the APA definition. So it follows that a general statement of policy “is a rule 
subject to the requirements of CRA.”17 
There has been no attempt to invalidate the leveraged lending guidance. 
But shortly after that opinion, the GAO reached a similar conclusion about a 
guidance document that has many more enemies: the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau’s statement about discrimination risks in indirect auto 
lending.18 The auto lending guidance, issued in 2013, expressed the Bureau’s 
view that certain indirect auto lenders have obligations under the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act (“ECOA”); it points out that these lenders may be liable under 
ECOA if their own conduct is discriminatory; and it points out ways a lender 
can mitigate its risk of ECOA liability.19 Many politicians, as well as many 
auto lenders, have sharply criticized the auto lending guidance since it first 
came out.20 On May 21, 2018, the guidance became the first guidance 
document to be the subject of a successful CRA resolution.21 
The auto lending guidance may turn out to be an anomaly. It had 
inspired an unusually high degree of anger, a greater amount than most rules 
of any kind. But the GAO’s interpretation of guidance documents as rules 
opens up a wide range of past policymaking for potential CRA action because 
the statutory timeline is tolled until a document is sent to Congress. Until the 
GAO’s recent decisions, it is likely agencies usually did not transmit guidance 
documents to Congress for CRA review.22 The normal course was to submit 
																																								 																				
17 Id. 
18 Letter from Thomas H. Armstrong, General Counsel, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., to 
Senator Pat Toomey, U.S. Senate (Dec. 5, 2017) (on file with U.S. Gov’t Accountability 
Off., https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/688763.pdf.) 
19 Bulletin re: indirect auto lending and compliance with the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Mar. 21, 2013), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-
compliance/guidance/supervisory-guidance/bulletin-indirect-auto-lending-compliance/ 
[https://perma.cc/KS2Q-T3A8] [hereinafter “Bulletin”]. 
20 See, e.g., Nat’l. Auto. Dealers Ass’n. and Nat’l. Auto. of Minority Auto. Dealers, NADA 
and NAMAD Question CFPB’s Approach in Its Guidance on Auto Lending, (Mar. 21, 2013), 
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/nada-and-namad-question-cfpbs-approach-in-its-
guidance-on-auto-lending-199444951.html [https://perma.cc/9LVD-TX5G] (discussing auto 
dealer associations describing the guidance as an “anti-competitive approach” that will “only 
weaken the consumer’s ability to secure financing at the lowest possible cost”); Kim B. Perez, 
The CFPB Indirectly Regulated Lending Through Auto Dealers, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 399, 
400 n.7 (2013) http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1375&context=nc 
bi [https://perma.cc/A2QB-9ABW] (collecting letters from senators and congressmen). 
21 Pub. L. No. 115-172, 132 Stat. 1290 (2018). 
22 Arguably, agencies had some warning about the position the GAO might take. In 1997, 
the GAO opined on whether a National Forest Land and Resource Management Plan was a 
rule for CRA purposes; that opinion used reasoning fairly similar to the recent opinions. 
                                   Journal of Law & Public Affairs                [May 2019 
	
	
464 
only documents published in the Federal Register, and not even all of those.23 
Because the deadline for introducing a CRA resolution is 60 session days after 
the agency sends the rule to Congress, the CRA window is open for countless 
past agency guidance documents. 
Some commenters have taken the position that the GAO is simply 
mistaken. For example, Professor David Zaring argues that a “rule” is 
something that “prescribe[s] law or policy,” and general guidance documents 
do not.24 But a statement that is “designed to implement . . . policy” is also a 
rule, and that description seems broad enough to cover most guidance 
documents.  In any case, this argument is unlikely to dissuade both legislators 
from introducing CRA resolutions attacking guidance documents and 
Congress from passing those resolutions.  
We argue in this essay that, in fact, CRA resolutions to nullify these 
guidance documents will be ineffectual. The CRA is truly a tool meant for 
defeating legislative rules. That power is important, no doubt. But CRA 
resolutions to nullify past policies that an agency might not have submitted for 
congressional review will, we argue, have no effect on the agency’s actual 
policy and activities. Further, understanding why the CRA’s effect is limited 
will illustrate certain limits on the meaning of the “no reissuance” rule. 
 
III. DISAPPROVAL OF POLICY STATEMENTS 
	
A. Character of Policy Statements and Guidance Documents 
	
We begin with the practical realities of guidance documents and policy 
statements. It is fairly well understood what these documents do, and what they 
do not do. Pure guidance documents might inform the public about the 
agency’s policy priorities, its plans for enforcement, its forecasts about the 
direction of regulatory policy, its expectations for the conduct of regulated 
																																								 																				
Letter from Robert P. Murphy, General Counsel, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., to Senators 
Ted Stevens, Frank H. Murkowski, and Don Young, U.S. Senate (Jul. 3, 1997), (on file with 
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., https://www.gao.gov/decisions/cra/tongass.pdf). That the 
respective agencies had not sent the leveraged lending guidance or the auto lending bulletin 
for review suggests agencies have not been observant on this point.  
23 See KRIS NGUYEN, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-436T, OPPORTUNITIES TO 
IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS AND TRANSPARENCY OF REGULATORY AND GUIDANCE 
PRACTICES 13 (2018), where the GAO reviewed CRA compliance for significant rules and 
found it was at around 75%. Presumably compliance rates were worse for less significant rules. 
24 David Zaring, Guidance and the Congressional Review Act, THE REG. REV. (Feb. 15, 
2018), https://www.theregreview.org/2018/02/15/zaring-guidance-congressional-review-act/ 
[https://perma.cc/FL33-NUDH]. 
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entities, its understanding about prevailing economic conditions or techno-
logical capabilities, and more. It does not, however, establish rights or 
obligations that are binding on the public or on the agency. Of course, disputes 
frequently arise about whether an agency statement is truly just a policy 
statement, or if it is actually a legislative rule, especially as agencies sometimes 
mischaracterize their documents.25 But, assuming a document is a policy 
statement, it does not grant an agency authority to act in accordance with such 
policy: when the agency wants to take regulatory action consistent with a policy 
statement, say by enforcing a regulation, the policy statement is neither a prereq-
uisite for the action, nor sufficient authority for the action. Fundamentally, the 
agency’s authority for the action depends on the underlying statute or regulation, 
regardless of what the policy statement says.26 “When the agency applies [a 
general statement of] policy in a particular situation, it must be prepared to 
support the policy just as if the policy statement had never been issued.”27 
Thus, agencies’ inattentiveness in failing to submit policy statements 
to Congress is understandable. Outside the CRA, any possible status of these 
documents as “rules” has had little legal significance. These general statements 
of policy are exempt from notice and comment rulemaking procedures under 
the APA.28 They are not binding on the agencies or on regulated parties.29 
Finally, under the APA, agencies are supposed to publish these policy 
statements in the Federal Register, but incomplete compliance does not 
typically result in serious consequences.30  
																																								 																				
25 See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. Dept. of Labor, 174 F.3d 206, 212-213 (D.C. Cir. 
1999); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
26 A policy can change the landscape for enforcement, by providing notice to regulated 
parties that particular types of conduct may incur penalties. But the policy would still not be 
the legal justification for imposing a penalty; and conversely many forms of relief (injunctive 
orders, restitution, compensatory damages) and often even penalties are available without an 
agency’s having previously given warning through a policy statement. 
27 Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Pacific Gas & 
Electric Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
28 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). 
29 See Clarian Health W., LLC v. Hargan, 878 F.3d 346, 357 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“[T]he Manual 
instructions constitute a policy statement . . . [because] they have no binding legal effect.”); 
Holistic Candlers & Consumers Ass’n v. Food and Drug Admin., 664 F.3d 940, 944 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012) (“[A]n FDA warning letter compels action by neither the recipient nor the 
agency.”). 
30 5 U.S.C. § 552(a). We do not mean to condone agencies’ failing to follow rigorously the 
statutory requirement to publish their statements of policy. However, the most significant 
legal consequence of a failure to publish a document is that the document cannot be the basis 
for imposing adverse consequences on the public. A guidance document cannot be the 
grounds for adverse consequences anyway. Nat’l Mining Ass’n, 758 F.3d at 252.  
 
                                   Journal of Law & Public Affairs                [May 2019 
	
	
466 
The auto lending guidance targeted by the CRA resolution illustrates 
the character of policy statements. For purposes of this argument, we 
distinguish between two aspects of the bulletin: an interpretation of ECOA and 
a public notice about the Bureau’s views and enforcement plans. With respect 
to the public notice (we address the interpretation below in Section IV), the 
bulletin simply provides information about the Bureau’s views regarding the 
risks associated with a certain mode of lending called dealer markup, and the 
ways that indirect lenders can mitigate these risks.31 The bulletin points out that 
dealer markup may result in disparate impact in loan pricing and it warns 
indirect auto lenders that they “may be liable” if they allow dealer markup and 
the markup results in prohibited disparities.32 The bulletin also urges lenders to 
“take steps to ensure that they are operating in compliance,” and it identifies 
some steps that would help with respect to dealer markup.33  
Given the warning, it would be unsurprising if the Bureau initiated an 
enforcement action alleging that an indirect lender allowed dealer markups that 
resulted in discrimination. Indeed, we could infer that dealer markup was an 
enforcement priority. But to win such a case, the Bureau would have to persuade 
a court that, given the facts, the lender’s activities violated ECOA; the existence 
of the auto lending bulletin would not be so much as a thumb on the scale in the 
court’s decision.34 With respect to the risk-mitigation practices that the bulletin 
suggests, the Bureau clearly favored those actions. The bulletin itself does not, 
and cannot, obligate a lender to implement those risk-mitigation practices. 
Recent events underline the nature of guidance documents and policy 
statements. Most of the federal agencies regulating the financial industry issued 
statements affirming that guidance documents are not binding. The joint 
statement from the prudential regulators (the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the National Credit Union Administration) 
and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau asserts that, as we have 
explained above, “supervisory guidance outlines the agencies’ supervisory 
expectations or priorities and articulates the agencies’ general views regarding 
appropriate practices for a given subject area.”35 Furthermore, “any citations 
																																								 																				
31 Bulletin, supra note 19 at 3-5. 
32 Id. at 3. 
33 Id. at 4. 
34 Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“Unlike legislative rules, non-
binding agency statements carry no more weight on judicial review than their inherent 
persuasiveness commands.”).  
35 Interagency Statement Clarifying the Role of Supervisory Guidance, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. 
BUREAU (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/agencies-iss 
ue-statement-reaffirming-role-supervisory-guidance/ [https://perma.cc/RBX5-Y3EU].  
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will be for violations of law,” rather than for “a ‘violation’ of supervisory 
guidance.”36 The Chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission also issued 
a statement asserting that the Commission has long said its staff guidance is 
not binding or legally enforceable.37  
 
B. The Ineffectiveness of the CRA as to Policy Statements 
	
The nature of policy statements makes a CRA resolution rather useless. 
Let’s suppose, for purposes of argument, that a CRA resolution was successful 
in blocking the Bureau from maintaining its auto lending policy statement. 
Then the Bureau could still bring an enforcement case based on dealer markup. 
Just as the policy statement did not justify or authorize such cases, the absence 
of the policy statement would not bar them. The facts of a given case would 
make the conduct a violation, or not, depending on the content of ECOA and 
Regulation B—even in the absence of the policy statement. Additionally, the 
Bureau could, in the enforcement action, encourage the sorts of company 
policy that the policy statement recommended.38 For example, the Bureau 
could reach a settlement in which the defendant promises to adopt those 
policies; the Bureau could ask for an injunction requiring those steps; or it 
could accept a more lenient penalty on the basis of a company’s policies along 
those lines. An agency does those things on a case-by-case basis, and it could 
keep doing that without the policy statement. 
As a practical matter, for a regulated entity it often may not seem like 
there is much difference between a regulation and a policy statement.  If the 
Bureau says it wants auto lenders to impose certain controls on dealer markup, 
a typical lender might not think of that suggestion as optional.39 After all, even 
																																								 																				
36 Id. The tone of the statement suggests that perhaps the prudential regulators have 
occasionally overplayed the role of their guidance documents, and maybe examiners actually 
have treated guidance as binding. That behavior would not be surprising, or inconsistent with 
our arguments. Supervisory agencies frequently issue directives and instructions to regulated 
institutions that carry special weight because of the supervisory role and authority.  
37 Jay Clayton, Statement Regarding SEC Staff Views, U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N (Sept. 13, 
2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-091318 [https://perma. 
cc/6PCM-XU8E]. 
38 Perhaps if a policy statement described a rubric for enforcement prioritization, a CRA 
resolution could block the agency from prioritizing enforcement cases in that particular way. 
It would be easy for an agency to sidestep this use of the CRA, so as to render the resolution 
ineffectual. 
39 See Nat’l Mining Ass’n, 758 F.3d at 253 (“[W]hile regulated parties may feel pressure to 
voluntarily conform their behavior because the writing is on the wall about what will be 
needed to obtain a permit, there has been no ‘order compelling the regulated entity to do 
anything.’”).  
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if in principle a company has the right to argue that its dealer markups are legal, 
the expense of the fight and the uncertainty of the outcome might make it 
utterly impractical. An agency’s pronouncement that it thinks a certain practice 
could be a violation will often be enough to end the practice.40  
Still, there is a key difference between that dynamic and the impact of 
a genuine legislative regulation. For example, the Bureau adopted a legislative 
rule prohibiting class-action waivers in arbitration clauses, and a CRA 
resolution disapproving that rule became law.41 Absent the arbitration rule, 
there is no rule generally prohibiting class-arbitration waivers. So a company 
can confidently include those waivers in its consumer finance contracts, and 
continue to use them. By contrast, suppose the CRA resolution against the auto 
lending bulletin passes. We doubt any company will be confident that, because 
of the CRA resolution, it can use dealer markups freely.42 
We are not the first to observe these characteristics of policy 
statements. However, we believe it is important to recognize the full 
implications with respect to the CRA. A policy statement might be a rule; the 
CRA might entitle the majority to pass a resolution disapproving the rule using 
expedited procedures; and the resolution might then wipe the policy statement 
out, as though it had never been. Nothing in the real world would change as a 
result—either for the agency or for regulated entities. 
Finally, looking to the text of the CRA, it is consistent with this 
discussion, and does not suggest that a CRA resolution should have any 
significance for a policy statement. The language that the CRA mandates for a 
																																								 																				
40 For example, in 2013, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency jointly issued guidance that said deposit advance loans pose 
risks to bank safety and soundness, and indicated they would scrutinize such products 
carefully during supervisory examinations. Guidance on Supervisory Concerns and 
Expectations Regarding Deposit Advance Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 70,552 (Nov. 26, 2013). 
According to the American Bankers Association, banks heeded the warning, and all but one 
bank stopped offering the product entirely. Small Dollar Credit, AM. BANKERS ASS’N 5 (Apr. 
2017), https://www.aba.com/Advocacy/Documents/SmallDollarWhitePaper2017Apr.pdf. 
41 See Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 
33,210 (July 19, 2017) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1040); Joint Resolution, Pub. L. No. 
115-74, 131 Stat. 1243 (2017) (invalidating the rule).  
42 Lenders may have more freedom to use dealer markup, because the new leadership at the 
Bureau may no longer believe dealer markup is illegal and may not want to take enforcement 
action against markup policies. If so, what matters is that the views of Bureau leadership 
have changed—not that a CRA resolution affirmed the new views. On the other hand, ECOA 
violations are, in principle, subject to private rights of action. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(e). Just as 
the existence of the Bureau’s policy statement would have been of only marginal benefit for 
a plaintiff’s proof in a case involving dealer markup, the disappearance of the policy 
statement does not undermine such a case. 
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resolution makes such a resolution irrelevant for policy statements because the 
resolution has to say the subject rule “shall have no force and effect.”43 A 
policy statement, by its very nature, has no legal force or effect.44 Similarly, 
while “[a]ny rule that takes effect and is later made of no force and effect by 
enactment of a joint resolution . . . shall be treated as though such rule had 
never taken effect,” a policy statement is not “made of no force and effect” by 
a CRA resolution.45 A policy statement had no force and effect in the first 
place. The reference to “tak[ing] effect” seems, superficially, like it could be 
relevant to policy statements; an agency might speak of a policy’s “effective 
date,” meaning the point after which the agency would begin acting in 
accordance with the statement. However, given the repeated usage of “force 
and effect,” that is evidently not the sort of “effect” that the CRA means.  
Nor does the “salting the earth” provision in the CRA have any 
consequence for a policy statement. The Bureau asserted that, thanks to that 
provision, the CRA resolution about the auto lending policy statement “prohibits 
the Bureau from ever reissuing a substantially similar rule.”46 However, the 
“salting the earth” provision only says, “[a] rule that does not take effect (or does 
not continue)” due to a CRA resolution “may not be reissued in substantially the 
same form.”47 This restriction has no import for a policy statement, because the 
agency could all along have acted in the same way without issuing the statement. 
For a legislative rule, issuance is a key step without which the rule has no effect. 
For a policy statement, issuance is simply a convenient way to provide 
information.48  
To be clear, Congress can, of course, restrict how an agency carries out 
its policy preferences, including how it prioritizes enforcement. One common 
																																								 																				
43 5 U.S.C. § 802(a). 
44 At most, the agency must provide an explanation for declining to follow its policy 
statement. But the bar for such an explanation is not high. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Fed. 
Energy Reg. Comm’n, 315 F.3d 316, 323 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (affirming agency’s decision to 
rely on old policy statement instead of current one for reasons of “administrative 
convenience” and finding that “‘[p]olicy statements’ differ from substantive rules that carry 
the ‘force of law,’ because they lack ‘present binding effect’ on the agency”)  
45 § 801(f). 
46 Statement of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection on enactment of S.J. Res. 57, 
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (May 21, 2018), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-
us/newsroom/statement-bureau-consumer-financial-protection-enactment-sj-res-57/ [https://per 
ma.cc/M5CX-3UVP] (providing statement from Mick Mulvaney, Acting Director, Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau).  
47 § 801(b)(2). 
48 At most the CRA would prohibit the agency from issuing the policy statement—an 
outcome that would mean the agency could not tell the public about beliefs, policies, or 
priorities even though it could implement them.  
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tool is limiting language in appropriations. For example, appropriations laws 
have repeatedly prohibited the Department of Justice from spending funds to 
prosecute certain types of crime involving marijuana.49 Another appropriations 
law restricted the Department of Energy from implementing a statutory 
provision under which, otherwise, it was supposed to limit sales of 
incandescent light bulbs.50 We are not arguing that limitations like these are 
beyond Congress’s power. Rather, the point is that a CRA resolution does not 
impose such limitations. CRA resolutions have specific language and a specific 
purpose, to prevent the subject rules from having “force and effect.” That 
language is about legislative rules, not policy statements. 
In sum, a CRA resolution disapproving a policy statement is a fairly 
hollow exercise from a legal point of view. The resolution may have some 
value as a rhetorical tool in political debates. To be sure, a very large number 
of agency documents are purely policy statements and expressing disapproval 
via a CRA resolution may be a useful way to send a message—to the agency 
or to voters—about an agency’s policy. However, there is nothing that a CRA 
resolution about a policy statement would prevent an agency from doing, and 
no protection that it would provide to a regulated party.  
 
IV. DISAPPROVAL OF INTERPRETIVE RULES 
 
An analogous argument can be made about many interpretive rules. 
Textually, the argument is essentially the same. A CRA resolution prevents a 
rule from having “force and effect”; and myriad cases have said that 
interpretive rules have no binding legal force.51  
Of course, a subset of interpretive rules have, according to the Supreme 
Court, “the force of law.” These are interpretations from agencies that have the 
authority to speak with that force on certain ambiguous statutory provisions, and 
that the agencies have issued through a “relatively formal administrative 
procedure” appropriate for interpretations having legal force.52 The strength of 
																																								 																				
49 See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 115-141, § 538 (2018).  
50 See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L 114-113 § 312, 129 Stat. 2419 (2016). 
There is no principled reason that restrictions like these could not go into other laws; 
appropriations bills are attractive mainly because they are relatively unlikely to attract a 
filibuster or veto.   
51 See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1204 (2015) (“Interpretive rules do 
not have the force and effect of law and are not accorded that weight in the adjudicatory 
process.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 
441 U.S. 281, 315 (1979) (“A court is not required to give effect to an interpretative 
regulation.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
52 U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 240 (2001) (internal quotations omitted). 
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that characterization in Mead illustrates the converse as well, that very many 
interpretive rules do not carry the force of law.53 Just like policy statements, 
these rules can be regarded as not having “force and effect” under the CRA, so 
that CRA resolutions do not really affect them. 
The CFPB’s auto lending bulletin is a good illustration for this point as 
well. The bulletin explains what it means to be a “creditor” under ECOA.54 
Based on this interpretation, the bulletin describes two sets of credit practices 
that, if an indirect lender used them, would “likely” make the lender a 
“creditor” under ECOA.55 Whether these observations in the bulletin are 
correct depends on the content of ECOA and Regulation B. We take for granted 
that the bulletin would not deserve Chevron deference. Were the Bureau to take 
enforcement action asserting a lender was a creditor of the type described in 
the bulletin, the Bureau would not be able to rely on the bulletin itself as the 
authority for the proposition. On the other hand, if the bulletin didn’t exist, the 
Bureau would have the same ability to bring, and perhaps win, an enforcement 
action using the same interpretation.56   
Not only does the text of the CRA suggest a similar result for 
interpretive rules as for policy statements, the functional arguments work the 
same as well. The key similarity is that, just as with policy statements, 
interpretations do not need to be rules. As noted above, an agency can prioritize 
in a given way, or adopt a particular policy in the course of enforcement 
actions, without having issued a policy statement. An agency can provide a 
																																								 																				
53 See Ass'n of Flight Attendants-CWA v. Huerta, 785 F.3d 710, 716 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(“Interpretive rules do not carry the force and effect of law.”); see also Am. Mining Cong. v. 
Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1111-12 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (explaining that a 
“purported interpretive rule” that has “legal effect” is actually “a legislative, not an interpretive 
rule”). Some circuits accord Chevron deference to rules that are more informal than would earn 
deference in others. See Doe v. Leavitt, 552 F.3d 75, 80 (1st Cir. 2009) (comparing examples 
in First and D.C. Circuits). This fuzziness at the Mead boundary does not alter the basic point 
that many interpretive rules have no legal force. In addition, there might be special cases. For 
example, an agency might have contracts that bind its contractors to respect its interpretations. 
The possibility of such cases does not make the general proposition less valid. 
54 Bulletin, supra note 19 at 2. 
55 Id. 
56 Of course, an agency can get Seminole Rock deference for an interpretation of its regulations 
even if it presents the interpretation informally. See generally Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 
(1997); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945). However, the courts have 
not spoken of this deference as giving the force of law to such interpretations. See Transcript 
of Oral Argument at 28:8-12, Kisor v. Wilkie, No. 18-15 (S. Ct. Mar. 27, 2019) (Chief Justice 
Roberts expressing doubt that regulatory interpretations “have the force and effect of law”). 
Indeed, the way Seminole Rock deference works belies the notion that any given articulation of 
the interpretation has the force of law. The agency could state the interpretation in any format, 
including in an enforcement action, and deserve the same deference. The deference does not 
accrue to a particular interpretation arising in a rule having the force of law. 
                                   Journal of Law & Public Affairs                [May 2019 
	
	
472 
given interpretation, without the force of law, in the course of an enforcement 
action; in an informal adjudication on a non-enforcement issue; in an amicus 
brief; etc. If the CRA prevented the agency from “issu[ing] [a] rule” stating 
that interpretation, that restriction would not stop the agency from having the 
same view or effectuating it in any of those other ways.  
 
V. DISAPPROVAL OF LEGISLATIVE RULES 
 
In conclusion, a CRA resolution matters only when the rule at issue 
would have “force and effect” in the absence of the resolution. Legislative rules 
in general have this character, and for them CRA resolutions are highly 
consequential. Still, as we noted above, exactly what those consequences are 
remains to be seen. In general, we can expect it to be some time before this 
issue plays out. After all, the CRA resolutions passed in this congressional 
session aligned with the policies of the Trump Administration; and current 
agency heads are unlikely to test the boundaries of “no force and effect” or 
“substantially similar.”  
Future agency heads, in a new administration, may want to test these 
boundaries. If so, the discussion here offers one way to think about the issues. 
Every final rule that is legislative in the main contains some additional material 
that amounts only to discussion of the agency’s policy views, explanation of 
enforcement priorities, etc. Our argument leads to the conclusion that had the 
agency issued those aspects of the rule separately, a CRA resolution would not 
have affected them—because they would have had no force and effect in any 
case. They should have no more force and effect when incorporated in a 
legislative rule.57 If that is correct, then eliminating the legal force of the 
legislative rule ought not to block the agency from implementing the policy 
features that were not legislative. At a minimum, “substantially similar” should 
measure only the legislative features of a rule. 
 
																																								 																				
57 Often, interpretations in a legislative rule will deserve Chevron deference. As we made 
clear above, our arguments that CRA resolutions do not affect interpretive rules focused on 
interpretations that do not deserve such deference. 	
